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Abstract 
The dominant assumption about self-disclosure asserts that sharing information about oneself is 
solely a matter of individual choice. However in the context of identity disclosures, the aspect of 
self that is being disclosed is attached to the backdrop of the socio-political environment of 
which the act and agent are situated in. In this regard, it becomes questionable whether people 
disclosing socially stigmatized and devalued identities such as disability are truly matters of 
individual freedoms around choice making. This paper aims to highlight how opportunities for 
discussing experiences and issues involving one’s disability identity are limited to formalized 
institutional spaces or silenced in informal spaces due to the authority of medical cognition 
around disability within western societies. This lessens the control and authority of disabled 
people over the way in which disability is understood within the society as a homogenized 
identity defined through third-party authorities and cannot reflect the complex and nuanced 
identities formed through lived experiences. By examining the parameters of self-disclosure 
surrounding opportunities to claim and discuss one’s identity with the inclusion of disability(ies), 
discourses of self-disclosure can be pushed towards informal interpersonal spaces rather than 
limited formal spaces so as to weaken the attitudinal barriers which form the basis for disabling 
social structures and creates unequal citizenship.  
Keywords: Self-Disclosure, Disability, Identity-Politics, Freedom of Choice, Citizenship.  
 
Placards fermés et bocaux à poissons : le processus de la révélation publique d’un handicap 
Résumé 
L’hypothèse dominante à propos de la divulgation de soi, affirme que partager des informations 
personnelles est un choix purement individuel. Toutefois, dans le contexte de la révélation 
publique d’une identité, l’aspect de soi qui est divulgué existe dans un contexte socio-politique 
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où l’agent et son acte sont tous deux situés. À cet égard, il devient très suspect de considérer que, 
lorsque l’on divulgue des identités qui sont socialement stigmatisées et dévaluées, comme le 
handicap, cela demeure simplement une question de liberté individuelle et de choix personnel. 
Dans cet essai, je veux montrer comment les opportunités que l’on a de discuter d’expériences et 
de problèmes se reliant à nos identités en tant que personnes handicapées se limitent à des 
espaces institutionnels officiels, ou bien, qui sont réduites au silence dans les espaces plus 
informels due  à l’autorité qu’as la connaissance médicale à propos du handicap dans notre 
société occidentale. Cette tendance réduit l’autorité et le contrôle que peuvent avoir les personnes 
handicapées sur la façon dont le handicap est conçu dans notre société. Le handicap, en tant 
qu’identité homogène qui ne peut être définie que par le biais d’une autorité de tierce partie, ne 
peuvent refléter la complexité et les nuances d’une identité formée à travers les expériences-
vécues d’une personne handicapée.  L’examen des paramètres que peuvent avoir la divulgation 
de soi, ayant trait aux opportunités d’affirmer et de discuter de son identité, incluant de ses 
handicaps, rends possible l’inclusion des discours d’auto-divulgation dans les espaces 
interpersonnels informels, au lieu d’être limité aux espaces formels seulement. Le résultat est un 
affaiblissement des barrières attitudinales qui forment la base des structures sociales qui nous 
handicape, et qui créent une citoyenneté inégale pour les personnes handicapées.  
Mots Clefs: Auto-divulgation; Handicap; Politiques identitaires; Liberté de choix 
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Locked Closets and Fishbowls: Self-disclosing Disabilities 
The image of a closet seems innocent enough when taken in a literal context as a 
convenient storage space, but against its’ social backdrop the closet becomes a political space 
associated with tropes about secrecy, hiding, fear, shame, immorality, and deviancy. In other 
words, it becomes a metaphysical space where a person stores away anything about herself that 
is considered too inappropriate and bizarre to fit into the limiting boundaries set by the dominant 
society. To “come out” of the closet then, in terms of identity labels, is considered to be an act of 
epistemic revelation in which the person’s hidden aspects of herself crosses over from unknown 
to known in public contemplation (Sedgewick 1990)1, an act of political liberation in its’ 
challenge to social norms by refusing to be hidden and unfitting (Anspach 1979 pp.765, Mensah 
& Haig 2011 pp. 6), to live an authentic life in terms of one’s moral duty to be truthful 
(MacLachlan 2012), and as an act of inclusion and empowerment on a personal identity level 
(Britt & Heise 2000 pp 2).  
To consider the departure from the closet solely as such is troubling though, as it suggests 
that one’s reasons for not leaving the closet must always be due to shame and other negative 
emotions, and this reinforces the notion that closeted identities are ones which a person ought to 
be ashamed of. Surely, there are other reasons for concealing an identity which have nothing to 
do with the personal desires of the closeted individual to keep this significant part of herself out 
of spheres of social interaction but are instead responses to hostile social attitudes and political 
                                                          
1. On pg 76-77 of The Epistemology of the Closet 1990, Eve Sedgewick analyzed the biblical story of Queen 
Esther from The Book of Esther as retold by Jean Racine through his work in 1949. In this tale, Esther is a 
Jewish woman who concealed this aspect of her identity from her husband King Assuerus who has 
categorized her people as unclean and unnatural. Upon hearing of the King’s intention to commit 
genocide against her people, Esther revealed her identity to him. Although Sedgewick used this example 
to primarily explore the tropes of “the closet” in regards to the queer community, I believe that the shift 
from private to public discourse that one’s identity undergoes in the process of self-disclosing is important 
to account for when considering the disclosing of any stigmatized identities. 
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dismissals of the closeted identity rather than the identity being one which is worthy of its 
shaming. The idea that alternatives to shame must be included when theorizing non-disclosure is 
supported by Olney and Brockleman’s findings through their interviews of students with which 
they asserted that, “reasons for concealing a disability vary from situation to situation and are not 
always due to fear and shame” (pp.35, 2003).  
The association of closeted disability identities with such negative sentiments as shame 
are problematic as they tend to reinforce the myth that disability is inherently negative; thus 
reifying the concept of disability as a personal tragedy and contributing to the stigmatization of 
disability identities and people with disabilities. Furthermore, this focus on the individualistic 
aspects of self-disclosure detaches the social from the individual and in doing so renders factors 
that construct disability as a devalued identity to be invisible for criticism in the context of 
closeting and outing. The individual’s agency cannot be separated from the influence of the 
socio-political environment and the historical background in which both the agent and the 
identity being disclosed is situated. Yet, the belief that self-disclosure as a matter of individual 
choice not only persists, but is dominant within Western industrialized societies and is apparent 
in both formal institutional and social interactive discourses around disclosing disabilities2. 
Therefore self-disclosing a socially stigmatized identity is conceptualized as similar to disclosing 
impersonal and apolitical facts about the self rather than being understood as a complex act of 
identity negotiation that has both personal and social consequences. Social influence cannot be 
ignored since self-disclosing involves the exposure of one’s status as a member of stigmatized 
social group and renders the relation between the individual and that status to be politically 
                                                          
2 In the 2005 article titled Self-Disclosure as a Situated Interactional Practice,  Antaki et al argued that self 
disclosure is a social performance, however the way in which the act was discussed still relies on the premise of 
the individual choosing to disclose and lacked considerations about factors that condition opportunities for 
disclosing. 
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visible. When self-disclosure is categorized into areas of personal responsibility;, contextual 
factors such as social responses to disability and their influence on one’s decision around 
disclosing are rendered invisible and untouchable to critique, thus allowing these socio-political 
factors to continue contributing to the social stigmatization and devaluation of disability and 
disabled people.  The so-called “choice” does not begin nor does it end at individual agency, as 
one’s identity is not an automaton that forms without the influence of social evaluation and 
dominant norms.  Therefore questions around the moral imperative to self-disclose cannot begin 
to be made without first considering the role of the social interpretations and responses to 
disability in relation to the individual’s. 
In the following paper, I will deconstruct the disability closet through an exploration of 
the social factors which frame and maintain it in order to show that the presumed autonomy 
behind one’s choice of self-disclosure is illusory at best, and that such an understanding of self-
disclosure disguises a systematic exclusion of disability identities from being a part of one’s 
participatory activities as a citizen. This will be done first, by demonstrating that identity 
disclosures are different from other types of personal revelations. Secondly, that social 
relationships and attitudes with the other party change upon self-disclosing stigmatized identities 
because both the other party’s understanding of the discloser and their epistemology about the 
disclosed identity has changed. Finally, I will argue that the work of negotiating an identity as a 
person with disabilities is a continuous process which does not end with the identity leaving the 
closet. These issues will be addressed by exploring the process of self-disclosure and its’ 
implications towards the moral status of persons with disabilities within the mores of our society; 
by which I mean beliefs about how one believes she ought to behave towards another based on 
her relationship and understanding of the other.  However before I begin, it is necessary to clarify 
LOCKED CLOSETS AND FISH BOWLS                                                                                                                          7 
 
 
my position in relation to this research, the type of self-disclosing as well as the theoretical 
approach to disclosing disabilities. 
Framing Approaches to Self-Disclosure 
To being with, the act of self-disclosing has assumed many different forms for various 
purposes within human history; ranging from crime-related or religious confessions to witness 
testimonials (Foucault, 1975-1976, p.42-43, Mensah & Haig, 2010, p.3), disclosure of personal 
problems in psychotherapy, to the admission of socially stigmatized identities such as disabled, 
queer, racial, and others that do not “fit” into ideas of normal (MacLachlan 2012, Sedgewick 
1996, Olney and Brockelman. 2003). The latter is the type which will be addressed in this paper 
and will be based on the premise that identity labels, particularly stigmatized ones, hold 
influence and consequences over an individual’s participation (Anspach, 1979, p.769). The scope 
of influence can extend over one’s inclusion in social activities, equal opportunities for moral 
growth, development of spirit and of interpersonal relationships, access to material resources, 
and to being considered eligible for the respect due to one’s status as a human person. Hence this 
paper examines the social in relation to the individual factors of identity politics as they take 
place around disclosing disabilities.3  
Secondly, although much of the work done on self-disclosure has been occupied with the 
ethical debate around a moral duty to fully disclose our identities (Sedgewick 1990, MacLachlan 
2012), or in the field of psychology where questions about the emotional and psychological 
impact of passing or disclosing are asked (Antaki & al 2005), I will not be addressing such 
                                                          
3 Identity politics are acts of negotiating social understanding and political recognition of a socially stigmatized 
group identity by its members. Lennard Davis wrote in Bending Over Backwards, Disability, Dismodernism and 
Other Difficult Positions that under post-modernist approaches to identity it is no longer relevant for scholars to 
examine issues pertaining to identity politics, as identity itself is realized as fluid and unstable social constructions. 
(2002). However, I believe that there is room to examine the notion of identity politics under a post-modernist 
understanding of identity when individual interpretations and negotiations of a social group identity are explored 
in relation to the socio-political climate of which the person is situated in.  
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questions about self-disclosing. I would like to divert the focus from the role of an individual’s 
moral duties to the social factors that surround or impede one’s agency of self-identifying as a 
person with disabilities.  
Thirdly, although the “closeted” members of the disability community are not only those 
with invisible disabilities, as I consider being out of the closet to mean living openly and 
accepting of oneself as having a disability, self-disclosure in this form would likely take a 
different form and encounter different issues. Also, the focus is on the supposed “choice” in 
disclosing that those with invisible disabilities presumably have; and in terms of highly visible 
disabilities, even that illusory “choice” is not present. Hence, self-disclosing within this paper 
will not address those differences out of respect that such an account deserves a far deeper and 
fuller exploration than the length of this paper can allow for.  
Furthermore, being a woman with an invisible disability from an ethnic minority 
background I am conscious of the fact that an individual’s experiences around self-disclosure are 
unique on account of their ethno-racial, gender, class, and sexual identities. However, by the 
same reasoning as above, I will not be examining the topic in regards to these differences and 
instead examine how the systematized norms around disability within westernized society 
creates barriers towards including oneself with a disability identity when carrying out day-to-day 
activities as a full citizen.   
Lastly, the idea of “citizenship” is crucial to this paper as it provides the conceptual 
framework for areas in which self-disclosing allows for the disclosed identity to participate in, as 
well as the spaces where factors impacting decisions to disclose and claim a stigmatized identity 
takes place. In the context of disclosures, I recognize citizenship by the formal status inferred 
from documented proof of citizenship that allows one to access legislative protections and 
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regulations that are specific to citizens belonging within a nation; as well as substantive 
citizenship which refer to practices that individuals engage in within their everyday lives as 
members of a community. In this regard, questions regarding access to full citizenship, which 
self-disclosing a disability involves, is based on the premise that persons with disabled identities 
encounter barriers to both formal and substantive forms of citizenship. Using Devlin and 
Pothier’s concept of “dis-citizenship” which they hold as an unequal type of citizenship imposed 
upon persons with disabilities (2005 p.17), I will suggest that claiming a disabled identity is 
connected to an unequal distribution of power between disabled and non-disabled social 
identities, and the factors which maintain such a relationship needs to be considered in 
discussions on self-disclosing disabilities.  
Exploring Identity Disclosures 
To begin with one may question what it means to self-disclose one’s identity with 
disability. Answering such a question requires an understanding of the differences between 
disclosing an identity and disclosing a purely informative statement in order to establish the 
former as part of an interactive process of relationship building between one or more persons. 
When an individual makes an identity disclosure, she is not only sharing an observation about 
her life experiences thus far, she is speaking of her ontological self. In disclosing membership to 
a social identity the person is sharing a part of herself that plays a significant and more 
permanent role in her public interactions; whereas disclosing a fact about herself, such as her 
likes and dislikes or her present embodied state, is a declaration about her life that is not always 
present in her social interactions. For example it would make sense to say that, “my ankle is 
hurting me,” in which the self identity is detached from the body part that has been injured, but 
not to say that, “part of me has a disability,” unless one is speaking specifically about the scope 
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of a physical and functional impairment4 rather than of her identity as a person with a disability. 
The latter includes the experiences of having being socially recognized with that identity within 
her public interactions alongside her private understandings of that identity within herself. The 
“I” that the communicator is referring to in the latter case does not refer only to her physical 
embodied self, but to her “self” on a personal level in relation to the audience. What is being 
disclosed in such situations is her social identity, and to be precise, I am referring to the personal 
identity of the individual as related to her identity as situated within her social sphere. This “self” 
being revealed is important because it is recognized not only by the individual who is disclosing, 
but also by others who interact with her within society, thus definitions of that self can be 
imposed upon the agent by others. However, knowledge gained from experiencing life with that 
identity would be available only to the disclosing agent’s self, and this may reflect a different 
understanding of disability that does not fit into social constructions of that identity.  Therefore, 
the knowledge that the disclosing agent shares about her own self would be different from that of 
the audience, and each revelation would be an act involving shifting the social perceptions of her 
own self along with the roles and assumptions associated with it.  
Although my main argument is that the opportunities around freedoms of choice to 
disclose such an identity are questionable, it is important that I provide a base sketch of which 
disability identity I am thinking of in terms of disclosure. By a disability identity, I am referring 
to the part of the individual’s identity which is recognized and labeled as disabled for bodily or 
                                                          
4 Many disability scholars have argued that using only the term disability leads to the exclusion of individual bodily 
experiences and thus the term “impairment” should be included into theorizing disability (Shakespeare 2006). I 
agree with Shelly Tremain (2002), as quoted by Devlin and Pothier in Introduction: Towards a Critical Theory of Dis-
citizenship (2005) that this term should not be understood as an apolitical one which can be used interchangeably 
with the term “disability”, as it is a term rooted in medical diagnoses used to describe a human body and functions 
in relation to socially established normative body and functions. Although I do use the term “impairment”, it will 
be used to describe biological differences as recognizable against the backdrop of socially established norms about 
human bodies.  
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mental deviations from socially accepted and medically informed norms. This recognition leads 
to specific attitudes and behaviours that are perceived as appropriate towards persons with that 
label rather than to the person herself. However, I am not claiming that a disability identity is 
merely a label forced upon part of the population by their socio-political system. By disability 
identity, I refer also to a person’s own definition of what it means to be a person with a disability 
as per her experiences of bodily impairments and disabling barriers towards active participation 
as a citizen with her social environment.   
The differences between identity disclosure and simply disclosing general information 
involving the self must be clarified from the beginning because it is far too easy in the context of 
dominant social thought to consider all types of disclosures as identical and individualized.  The 
act is different especially in the case of disability because the content of the information 
disclosed involves one’s mental or bodily impairments; yet the semantics of the disclosure of 
disability identities also applies to one’s identity in a social context. In neglecting this important 
difference, disability disclosures are not taken seriously for their work of including or excluding 
the person’s stigmatized identity into socially and politically interactive spaces, thus denying and 
devaluating the membership of that part of the person’s identity within civil society. When we 
understand self-disclosing as a relationship changing process, the risks that are involved in 
disclosing a socially stigmatized identity can be acknowledged, and thus we can begin to 
consider reasons other than shame and rejection of said identity for closeting certain identities 
such as disability. 
Negotiating Personal and Public Identity within Ableist5 Social Norms 
                                                          
5 Ableism is a term that describes discrimination or social prejudice against persons with disabilities and is often 
used to advocate for disability rights. 
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Shifting the center of self-disclosure from an individual basis to a social one illuminates 
the parallel process of transforming personal identity into public identity. By this, I am not 
saying that the individual’s identity itself changes, but only that the relationship between the 
person and the ones who are now privy to the information has changed. This is because the 
audience’s reality must account for the “new” identity (Olney & Brockelman, 2010, p. 45-46). 
Thus, personal identity and public identity are not the same. A person treats people differently in 
their lives, and this is not just based on the fact that each person is worthy of an individualized 
respect, but this is also due to social roles that are taught and internalized due to their 
entrenchment within social opinion. One’s system of knowledge and beliefs, which constructs 
their world view and affects their conduct towards objects within it, is formed through 
interactions carried out by the individual within the society. Therefore, the construction of this 
worldview is, partially constructed by encounters with social norms and expectations. For 
example, it is conceivable that a person treats each family member differently than each other 
even though they are all family; and this is because expectations towards each role and the 
person holding it are not identical.  
In this context, the way in which a person is treated as one with a disability in comparison 
to one without is different in a manner that cannot be explained by the audiences’ response to the 
person’s physical impairment as that response requires a recognition of disability that is socially 
situated and is thus influenced by negative perceptions of disability. For example, Barbara 
Goode noted in her experiences in telling someone about her disability, one of the reactions is 
skepticism and doubt of one’s identity as a person with a disability because she does not fit into 
the audience’s image of a person with a disability (1996, p. 43-44). Linton wrote about the well-
meaning but damaging encouragement to “overcome” one’s disabilities as though they were an 
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unsavory identity to be masked, healed, or rejected rather than embraced and acknowledged as a 
mere difference between persons (2010, p.228). The fact that, upon revelation to the “other”, the 
self-interpreted and personally accounted “I” generates response from that party implies that 
something has indeed changed. I do not mean that changes have occurred on a physical 
ontological sense; however, there is a change in social interactive norms as the listener’s 
interpretation of the new information affects how she believes she should behave towards the 
disclosing agent now. This belief is based on her interpretation of the socially normative attitude 
and assumptions she has about people who possess that identity which has just been revealed.         
The dialectical nature of self-disclosure here is important in relationships because it 
contributes to social epistemologies about disability identities made by persons who reside 
within a socio-political system constructed on ableist values, who often have a drastically 
different understanding of disability than those whose daily experiences and knowledge is 
informed by living with this identity. Such ideologies are often consequential in the lived 
realities of persons with disabilities and are observable in the existence of disability welfare 
programmes to address poverty among disabled people6 such as the Ontario Disability Support 
Program; continually high levels of unemployment rates among people with impairments; and 
the denial of citizenship to prospective immigrants with disabilities.  Consider for example, the 
socially dominant presumption that having a disability precludes one from being a socially 
productive citizen, an idea which defines a person’s social value through their financial 
sufficiency and productivity (Taylor 2004). The means of achieving this citizenship status within 
                                                          
6 The Participation and Activity Limitation Survey (PALS) found that the overall poverty rate for Canadian adults with 
disabilities was 10.6 % in 2006, meaning that 2.6 million disabled people in Canada live below the poverty line. 
(Council of Canadians with Disabilities http://www.ccdonline.ca/en/socialpolicy/poverty-citizenship/demographic-
profile/poverty-disability-canada)  
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western cultures often requires work which is organized around the functions of a specific type 
of body and minds.  
Furthermore, discourses of work are based on an average body within the society and this 
standard body correlates to medical authority over human bodily norms from which impairment 
is recognized as a deviation. Unaccommodating work environments and employer expectations 
create working conditions and employment criteria that limit accessibility to persons who can 
meet the criteria of having bodily functions which are consistent with average citizens. Even if a 
disabled worker or applicant were to request accommodations and disclose that she has a 
disability, there is still the fact that she is potentially competing against applicants who do not 
require accommodations. This capitalist concept of work is also problematic in its reliance on 
individual and independent labour models which means that persons with disabilities who 
require personal support in order to fulfill employment requirements must either turn to 
individual funding or work without support.  It also needs to be considered that employers 
without disabilities are also members of a society where dominant perceptions frame disabled 
people as financial liabilities or unemployable workers even before considerations about what 
the person holding a disability identity can enter a waged-work environment.  
It seems then, that the issue is not with disability or people who identify with disability 
but with social structures which do not account or accept for variations in bodily functions as a 
part of work norms. The influence of disability as a social label in the recognition of the 
individual by others cannot be ignored because persons with disabilities do not begin at an equal 
level from which to compete for employment against non-disabled persons, as is demanded by 
capitalist ideologies. This highlights an area where recognition of one’s identity as a disabled or 
non-disabled person impacts her access to areas of substantive citizenship. In this regard, the 
LOCKED CLOSETS AND FISH BOWLS                                                                                                                          
15 
 
 
valuation of an individual based on her productivity value rather than her innate human value is 
problematic for publically identifying with disability in that the devaluation of disability 
identities impacts the perception of her moral worth when associated with a disability. As Davis 
states, “Capitalism conceptualizes equality [among citizens] as equality among workers rather 
than financial equality.” (2002, p.110) This means that in order to be an equally valued citizen in 
western democratic societies one must be a working citizen. 
As negative presumptions about disability are significant to the construction of disability 
as a social identity, the eligibility for its inclusion into the lives of disabled people as equal 
citizens becomes difficult due to the way social structures frames disabled identities as ones 
which do not belong within regular citizenship activities. For example, in Holmes and Silvestri’s 
2011 study on the employment experience of Ontario’s postsecondary graduates with learning 
disabilities, 62% of respondents did not disclose their disabilities within their workplace even 
though 90% reported that their learning disabilities affected their performance. Seventy-five 
percent of the respondents stated that they did not disclose because they did not want to be 
judged for their disability (p.17).  The results of this study are important to include when 
exploring self-disclosing disabilities in that this study has pinpointed one of the most crucial 
factors that must be considered, which cannot be attributed to exploring individual responsibility 
and agency; the “rule of normalcy.”  
Normalcy is a term L. Davis uses to denote the use of linguistic systems which are 
socially influential and used by governing authorities to enforce the standardization of bodies 
and their functions for democratic rule over a homogenized representation of citizens who can be 
subjected to a nation’s legislative system (2002, p.108, 116). Society highly values those who 
can meet the imagined standards of normalcy to the point that those who are recognized as 
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deviant from those standards are excluded from active participation as citizens. This is 
demonstrated in the context of those who are represented as socially valuable citizens in relation 
to the types of productivity constructed as normative within that society. Embedded into the 
structures of various societies, these standards govern the categorization of appearances, actions, 
cognition, and conduct, into the socially normal or into the socially deviant (Foucault 1975, p. 
50, Sedgewick 1990). The salient point is that all identities in which a person can name or label 
herself with is measured against these norms; thus judgments and responses that are made 
against others are also based on these norms. By disclosing a disability, there is a high 
probability that the other will be influenced by socially dominant beliefs about disability, rather 
than actually listening or trusting the disclosing agent’s account of her own identity. Therefore, it 
is important that an individual with disabilities have the opportunity to self-disclose and provide 
an account of herself to others, because giving an account of one’s self is not only empowering 
in the ability to politically legitimize that aspect of one’s identity, but because it also challenges 
negative stereotypes that encourage that identity to remain closeted and silenced.  
The act of disclosing also allows the agent to add her own account of disability to the 
public discourse so that it may be drawn away from the limited definitive scope of formal 
institutional regulations, thus disrupting the socially dominant account of disability with her 
personal account. In this respect, each time a person self-discloses, the act is a process of re-
negotiating her personal identity against the presumptions those whom we are disclosing to have 
about that identity, as her own account of her identity is not the same as others’ account (Butler 
1990).  
Still, there is the matter of influence that a society’s normative belief about relationships 
and moral conduct has over interactions between the “other” and the discloser to consider. These 
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ideologies provide individuals with expectations about what is believed to be “appropriate” 
behaviour in regards to the other’s social identities. For example, for example, in most societies 
people are treated differently based on their gender roles, and these roles have been uniquely 
constructed in each culture and require examination to see how they have been situated. To 
clarify my position, I am not saying that it is hopeless to come out of the “closet,” only that the 
socio-political factors involved in framing and maintaining stigma around disability cannot be 
ignored, as they involve changing the act from being one about sharing personal information 
with another to one about her future treatment by the other. The shift that occurs in the revelation 
of stigmatized identities impacts the discloser’s experiences with the other, as those 
understandings about socially accepted attitudes towards her in relation to her newly revealed 
identity have changed. The discloser is also a member of the very society which stigmatizes her 
identity, and hence, her daily practices and thought processes are also embedded within these 
norms as well. It means that she is also directly or indirectly exposed to norms that devaluate 
disability identities and, in most cases, will possess the insight that publically revealing a 
stigmatized identity could possibly lead responses of violence, dismissal, denial, broken 
relationships, and lack of opportunity for employment because of awareness that the identity has 
a stigmatized social status (Jung 2011, Mensah et al. 2011, Olney et al. 2003, Maclachlan 2012). 
Thus, social norms act as the framework of the closet, and it is built by multiple “helping” hands, 
including the closeted one. Hence the choice of leaving a closet does not often present itself as an 
option, given her relations to others around her who contribute to limiting and false assumptions 
about disability. 
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Mechanics of Shifting Identities in Self-Disclosure 
So far, I have argued that self-disclosing is a social interactional process rather than an 
individual one. Such an action then, requires at least two or more parties, the discloser and the 
audience, because it is a social act that declares that the individual shares common socially 
definitive traits with the group she identifies with and thus can claim membership. This act 
involves changes to the audience’s perception of reality involving the disclosing party; in 
relation to their own notions attached to that particular identity, and to that particular person 
having disclosed.  MacLachlan, for example, pointed out that in order for a disclosure to count as 
an outing, the act must also be a revelation of an aspect of the individual which is not only 
surprising to the audience, but that membership into this category is not within the scope of 
social norms (2012 p. 4-5).  
Drawing on a personal example, when I disclosed to my martial arts club mates that I 
have a brain injury that requires them to avoid hitting my head during sparring sessions, their 
conduct towards me changed. Rather than being cautious only during the situation which I had 
specified that it was required, I was treated like fragile glass in all situations and many times 
excluded from sparring all together by being directed towards teaching techniques to the 
beginners where it was “safer.” The other reaction was to reject my disability and ignore my 
request to not hit my head as though I did not have such impairment. Of course, other factors 
might be due to the paternalistic history of the sport, and the disproportionate male to female 
membership ratio; however, the other non-disabled women were more often pushed to accept the 
same type of harsh training and prove their selves to be on an “equal” level to their male counter 
parts. In this case, my status as a person with disabilities has changed the thinking of those that I 
disclosed to in rendering me incapable of achieving “equal” status with the able-bodied students, 
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and excluding me to a less participatory role than befitting a participant of my particular level. 
The fact that I required a different way of participating in the same activities due to my 
impairment, grew into not being able to participate due to the disability being socially created 
either from a rejection of my disability identity, or from a skewed acceptance based on other’s 
perception of me as a person with impairment. In such experiences it is clear that disclosing an 
identity is more than just information sharing in general, but rather it is a way of positioning the 
person in a political and social context. The impact of the disclosure of identity filters down to 
the way in which we conduct our actions and conceive of each other in our interpersonal 
relationships.  
The other factor to consider with publicly self-identifying as disabled is the 
transformation of the audience’s attitudes. Oftentimes, self-disclosure is discussed only in terms 
of the disclosing agent’s moral duties and choice while neglecting the duties and response of the 
audience. To begin examining the role of the audience, I would like reify my previous point that 
people tend to adopt different attitudes in their interpersonal relationships according to their 
conceptualization of the other. This is important for pinpointing exactly what the shift is and its 
implications for the identity of the person within their society. Strawson noted in Freedom and 
Resentment that in ordinary human interactions a shift often occurs from a participant attitude to 
an objective attitude that affects how we conduct ourselves in interpersonal relationship (1993)7. 
I feel that considering the transition between these two attitude types is appropriate for 
discussing their implications for disclosing disability(ies). Holding a participant attitude towards 
another allows for consideration of the person as equal to other human beings and thus eligible to 
                                                          
7 Peter Strawson specifically discusses this change in attitude in relation to the mechanics of resentment by 
showing that shifts between objective and participant attitudes allow for judgments about the type of interaction 
that the other is eligible to receive in their ordinary human interactions shifts in ways that impacts attributions of 
responsible agency and capacity. (Freedom and Resentment 1993) 
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experience a normative range of human interpersonal treatment; whereas the objective attitude 
allows for both the denial of the person’s rights as a human being, such as autonomy, her right to 
association, and serious treatment of her thoughts, desires, and actions (Strawson 1993 p.7). For 
example, the students with invisible disabilities from Olney et al.’s article observed that “people 
can keep a distance from somebody with a disability” (2003 p.46). Such occurrences suggest that 
persons labeled with disabilities are perceived with an objective attitude and thereby ineligible to 
ordinary interpersonal interactions.  
I would argue that the consequences and existence of these attitudes exist not only in 
ordinary interpersonal relationships, but are also systematized in institutional practices and 
responses to invisible disabilities.  In Jung’s study, female students with chronic illness 
mentioned experiences with educators and university administration doubting their need for 
accommodations as well as their ability to fulfill the requirements of a post-graduate degree 
when being interviewed for admissions (2011 p.276). The reality of different interpersonal 
attitudes towards disability are pervasive in Western social political thought and governmentality 
and observable in policies and practices encouraging the segregation of children with learning 
disabilities in public schools, the recently ended reign of institutionalization8, the numerous 
researches that are being funded to “cure” or prevent disabilities, Canadian immigration policies’ 
health based determination for admission, and the prominent role of eugenics in Western 
European and North American history. These examples show that the social consequences of 
objective attitudes are familiar experiences for people who are publically and institutionally 
recognized with disabilities and have social repercussions as the person is left out of the system 
                                                          
8 Institutionalization for persons with cognitive and mental disabilities began in 1879 and recently ended in 2009 in 
Ontario with the final closures of three institutions including the Huronia Regional Center. It is the forced 
detainment of persons with mental, intellectual and physical disabilities. This closure was significant in that it 
marked a political shift in conceptualizing persons with disabilities as well as in considerations about the society’s 
responsibilities for including disabled people. (Radford 2011, p. 1) 
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of legal protections accorded to non-disabled citizens9. These situations demonstrate the 
prevalence of systematized and individual presumptions that disabled individuals are incapable 
of interacting in the same social sphere as average citizens. Such are the ways in which socially 
dominant attitudes about disability creates systematic exclusions of those who fall outside of 
health norms from engagement in social citizenship formation. Conceptual shifts about moral 
conduct towards persons with stigmatized identities are not neutral, but are reliant on a system of 
normative presumptions established by a society’s history and reinforced by institutional 
responses which conditions recognisability of a disclosed identity (Butler 2001 p. 25). Hence, 
any discourse about self-disclosure must involve not only the discloser, but the disclosee, as well 
as the socio-political environment where the act, agent, and recipient are situated within.  
Although I have established that a shift in conceptualizing the person and attitudes 
towards the person is involved in the disclosing disabilities, further questions need to be asked 
pertaining to this shift in attitudes such as, “where does this shift come from?” After all, the 
person is factually the same as before her disclosure. Based on the notion of existing social 
hierarchies, I believe that there is indeed a change in the person’s social role in terms of her 
interpersonal relations with the audience’s personal identity. As I have previously mentioned, 
every role comes with its’ own set of expectations from others which are grounded firmly in 
social norms, but I have yet to argue that the authoritative weight of each role is different as well. 
The power relations between the parties have also changed with the addition of the audiences’ 
recognition of disability. A person’s identity within society goes through chronological changes, 
in which different rights and notions of capacity are assigned to the publically emerging facets of 
identity which become available for others to interact with. Such as in the change from child to 
                                                          
9 Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener forward a powerful argument in the Moral Authority for Change: Human 
Rights Values and the Worldwide process of Disability Reform that the core values underlying principles of human 
rights; dignity, autonomy, equality, and solidarity, are often not within the reach of disabled people (2002 p. 14). 
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adult legal status or more specifically to people who acquired disabilities is the change from 
being viewed as an autonomous agent to being viewed as a medical subject. This can be 
observed in the fact that the police have the right to intrude upon one’s private establishment and 
search through one’s personal belongings for evidence of madness when the person is reported as 
such. In this regard, the power shift allows for the person to be legally deprived of crucial rights 
as a human being such as the capacity to make her own decisions, to have her desires and needs 
to be taken seriously, and to have a non-restricted place among other citizens (Quinn & Degener 
2002). 
This brings us to the transformation of the audience’s cognition and how this occurs in light of 
identity disclosures. As Butler discussed in Giving an Account of Oneself,  
“...my narrative begins in media res, when many things have already taken 
place to make me and my story in language possible. I am always 
recuperating, reconstructing, even as I produce myself differently in the 
very act of telling. There is that in me and of me for which I can give no 
account” (2001 p.27).  
This suggests that in making a self-disclosure about one’s disability identity, the person 
must also negotiate with the other on how the person she is interacting with should think of her 
and behave towards her, as the identity which she recognize herself as. That identity which 
others recognize and interact with may refer to the same thing; however, the accounts of her 
identity are not the same, hence there is a process of reconciliation between these two accounts 
occurring during self-disclosure as the agent shares her account of herself with the other, whether 
this is done so consciously or not. This negotiation involves not only the acceptance of said 
identity for its’ role in the individual’s overall identity, but also the audience’s reality about who 
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the individual is in relation to herself. After all, the identity that is now “out” did not previously 
factor into the audience’s concept of the disclosing agent’s identity thus the act of disclosure was 
a revelation to the audience in that something unknown has been revealed (MacLachlan 2012 
p.4). The beliefs that the listener now has about the disclosing individual is still the disclosee’s 
own interpretation of the person in relation to the disclosed content because the disclosee lacks 
the embodied experiences of the disclosure and thus cannot possibly have the same exact 
understanding of the disclosed information. In that respect, it is a true belief in relation to the 
listener, but it is not necessarily a true belief on the part of the discloser. Therefore the identity 
that the audience recognizes is different from the one that the disclosure has about herself. Thus 
self-disclosure does not necessarily mean that one’s identity is necessarily out of the closet, but 
rather that the other’s concept of what it means for a person to have a disability is imposed upon 
the disclosing agent (Anspach 1979 p.769). Therefore the work of self-disclosure does not end 
with exiting the closet of her disability identity, but it continues through the work of negotiating 
how the other should understand that identity and accord behaviour towards her10. This is quite 
apparent in the common reactions of doubt and skepticism towards those with invisible 
disabilities who self-disclose.  
Although it might seem that in giving an account of one’s personal identity the discloser 
is always in a position of privileged knowledge over the listener since she is giving an account of 
her identity as she knows it. However, it is not the case that one fully knows every aspect of 
herself, as that would rely on the presumption that identities are stable and impervious to 
situational influence. This is further supported by the fact that denial of identity both happens to 
the individual in instances where others dismiss or superimpose their understanding of a stated 
                                                          
10 MacLachlan and Sreedhar observed a similar observation about self-disclosing for Queer Femmes. (2012 p.9) 
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identity on the discloser as well as in moments where an individual uses definitions provided by 
others to deny their own accounts of disability. Although it may be accepted that self-knowledge 
is different from other’s knowledge due to different insights afforded by embodied experiences 
of disability within a network of socially constructed norms; the agent is often doubted or met 
with skeptical interrogation about the identity which has been revealed (Olney et Al 2010, p. 45, 
Jung 2011, p. 276). Rules of normalcy govern social identities such that expectations about how 
a person ought to be factors into the audiences’ recognition and acceptance of the person as 
someone who deserves a place within that social category.  This is true in the case of any 
stigmatized identities which do not fit the socially recognizable image of that identity. As 
MacLachlan and Sreedhar observed, coming out requires the audience uptake interpretations 
about the identity outside of the disclosing agent (2012 p.6), and in the case of a person 
disclosing invisible disabilities, her account is pitted against socially dominant narratives of 
disability.   
For example, a student with an invisible disability might request that she requires the aid 
of a recorder during her professor’s lectures, however the lecturer may object by citing reasons 
of unfairness to other students and in doing so, he is rejecting her need to use such 
accommodations in order to access the same educational opportunities as her classmates. Thus he 
is treating her as though she has no impairment and inadvertently doubts the authenticity of 
either her disability identity, or that persons with disabilities require accommodations to have 
access to fairness within an ableist society. Another example are cases where a person who has 
disclosed a disability is expected and encouraged to “overcome” her disability which implies that 
there is a norm which disability excludes her from and that overcoming it will allow her re-entry. 
In doing so, this demands that the individual be the one to change, rather than the inaccessible 
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environment and ableist social policies and attitudes, and also highlights the intolerance with 
which her disability identity is received (Linton 2010).  
I believe that the underlying basis for such unreasonable demands is doubt that one’s 
experiences with a disabled identity are different than those of her non-disabled counterparts. 
Such an attitude, that allows others to make demands on persons with disability identities to 
change themselves in order to fit in, is denying the reality that the society is based on a blueprint 
that excludes anyone outside of a very narrow set of norms.  Facing such doubts and sceptical 
attitudes is a situation that persons with invisible stigmatized identities often find themselves in 
(Sedgewick 1990, Maclachlan 2012, Linton 2010, Wendell 1996, Jung 2011, Olney & al. 2003, 
Holmes et al. 2011). Responses towards disability that come from the cultural interpretations of 
disability rather than from the perspective of the disclosing party allow for doubt because there is 
an unequal dialogue of power involved in these contradicting narratives. An account of a social 
identity that is mainstreamed within a society has the advantage being believed as uncontestable 
knowledge in that both social policies and attitudes reinforce those beliefs and hold them as the 
template for conduct towards persons holding that identity.   
This doubt is institutionally embedded through the demand that the individual is 
responsible for the burden of proof regarding a disability. First of all, this proof is not about 
demonstrating that there are disabling barriers within the society that rejects our impairments, but 
it is about normalizing the individual’s role as a person with disabilities so that it becomes 
recognizable within institutional policy and practices. For example, the Body Mass Index is a 
way in which medical authority officiate the types of bodies that are normalized and deemed 
worthy of access to full social citizenship based on height and age. Judgments based on this scale 
allow no room for those whose bodies “deviate” from the weight established as normal and 
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filters into the social concept of an “ideal” person. The judgements about ideal weight and the 
status of abnormality attached to those who fall outside of that weight allows for judgments 
about the person’s moral character and habits to be made because the person is labeled as 
“unwell.” Pervasive in the proclamation of “unwell” is the assumption that the person desires to 
be returned to the norm or to conform to it. Given the high social status and value of medical 
authority over a person’s body, combined with the abundance of information, some medically 
based standards have become a normalized part of interpersonal communication and interaction.  
For example, descriptions of women as thin, fat, or “morbidly” obese are commonly 
found in regular social interactions, yet such descriptions are dependent on a comparison to a 
body-type which is recognized as the ideal or healthy female body. The mainstreaming of health 
norms within institutional policies and moral interactions allow for a society to believe itself as 
having a right to demand that the “unwell,” become well or at the very least spend exhaustive 
efforts to do so. This can be seen in the numerous weight advertisements, the derogatory 
comments and “jokes,” and in the way in which the person is perceived by the fat label, rather 
than by personal identity. This quest for identifying and controlling the “abnormal” bodies is also 
prevalent in terms of bodily and mental impairments in the form of psychological assessments 
used in North American judicial systems, IQ testing, Memory Testing, Rehabilitative services, 
genetic screening, “special” education practices and many more. 
I am not saying that medical diagnoses are malicious instruments of social tyranny and 
that we should do without them, as often times medical descriptions allows for us to give words 
to talk about a disability. It can also empower by providing ways of controlling one’s own ways 
of living with disability in an ableist society through acknowledging diverse bodies and 
highlighting the differences in experiences that come with encountering environments suitable in 
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dealing with hegemonic person-types. However the fact that medical science is ultimately a 
social creation is not a point that can be ignored as its version of a disabled identity is created 
through discriminating the “abnormal” body from “normal” based on the social standards of a 
largely able-bodied culture. Much of this language that is used is rooted in historical implications 
of exclusion and deviancy; hence many such concepts are still connected by association to these 
words available for giving accounts of disability and describing experiences around this identity. 
When an institution, such as a university or welfare, demands medical proof of impairment, the 
individual’s self-identity, along with her experiences in having a disability, are removed from the 
medicalized account of herself a person with a disability.  
This is troubling for many reasons; first of all, the person’s right to autonomy to self-
disclose is compromised by the demand that she show detailed proof of her disability for the sake 
of receiving potentially equalizing services. This deprives her of controlling rights in that she 
cannot choose who to disclose her identity to, as well as when she wants to disclose it. These 
situations also place her in a double-bind situation where disclosing her identity subjects her to 
public and institutional scrutiny, while not disclosing may mean additional difficulties in 
academic achievements, or hinder her survival which would then be attributed to personal failure 
as social responsibilities are ignored. Secondly, this practice implies that the only socially 
acceptable version of disability which has legitimacy in formal institutions is not an account 
given by the person with disability who is seeking services, but one that is described by the 
authority of medicine (Wendell 1996). Therefore, distributions of such services are not grounded 
on needs but on medically informed assumptions about what people under that particular label 
need. This allows for the creation of a very narrow concept of a disability identity that must be 
legitimized by a third-party authority, and in doing so subjects those who do not fit into socially 
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defined notions of disability to skepticism and doubt, publically, socially, and even by the person 
herself. 
Final Thoughts on Disclosing Disabled Identities 
In conclusion, self-disclosure of a disability involves more than just the individual; it is a 
socially relational act, an act to change power dynamics, and a process of negotiating another set 
of social norms as oneself and others have internalized the label associated with it. A declaration 
of one’s closeted identity is a response to having that single facet of the individual’s whole 
identity face systematic exclusion from social participation as an equal subject. Yet, the 
assumption that identity disclosure is a matter of individual choice, as well as the notion that 
changes to a stigmatized identity could easily be rectified by widespread disclosure still persists. 
This type of assumption is personally damaging because it places the burden of guilt on the 
individual by insinuating that she is to be blamed for her continual discrimination, which is made 
possible by the assumption that only the individual can influence choice making. Secondly, in 
failing to consider reasons for concealing a disability other than shame and self-rejection, the 
listener is assigning a role to disability identity that scripts it as something that people ought to 
be ashamed of, thus reinforcing myths of dependency, inability, and personal tragedy related to 
disability.  
Refusing to disclose is not always a matter of comfort and acceptance of one’s disability 
identity, but it can also be a keeping control over one’s body and mind, or to avoid having 
another’s faulty version of having a disability imposed upon her. For example, there are many 
people with learning disabilities who choose to pass and not seek accommodations not because 
they wish to conform, but because the process involved with declaring a disability and getting 
accommodations is a long process made painful by the hegemony of ableist bureaucracy which 
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demands proof of our identity, or proof that we cannot, without accommodations, access the 
same societal participation opportunities (Olney et al. 2003, Jung 2011). The burden of proof is a 
heavy one that is not without consequences, as it subjects the self-disclosure to verifying 
processes that are society’s way of normalizing disability as the abnormal rather than include 
persons who identify as such within the society. In doing so, this alienates the individual from 
her status as a member of her community, whether she was to disclose or not, as long as her 
identity includes disability. In cases of passing and concealing, the individual is put into the 
conflicting position of being complacent in denying her disability identity a place in her life and 
in her community. Furthermore, as I have demonstrated, the proof demanded is often medically 
situated, which means that control over the account of one’s personal identity as a person with a 
disability is undermined by medically influenced authority rather than by her own authority. As 
the discloser’s identity is not detached from this structure, the constant skepticism and doubt 
about her experiences as a person with a disability makes way for internalizing doubt of her own 
identity. In doing so, she is invited to keep that identity closeted on the grounds that it seems to 
be non-existent to her peers and institutions around her as socially recognized imagery of, and 
expectations about persons with disabilities that are defined by non-disabled people do not 
appear to include her. Hence the “freedom” attributed to leaving the closet is an illusory one, due 
to the ableist social conditions and the prevalence of medical authority. The disability “closet” 
could more aptly be a fishbowl, because leaving the bowl means entering an environment that is 
currently as unsuited for the disabled body as land for fish out of the water.  
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